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Abstract
Dynamic average consensus is a decentralized control/estimation framework where a group of agents cooperatively track the av-
erage of local time-varying reference signals. In this paper, we develop a novel state decomposition-based privacy preservation
scheme to protect the privacy of agents when sharing information with neighboring agents. Specifically, we first show that an
external eavesdropper can successfully wiretap the reference signals of all agents in a conventional dynamic average consensus
algorithm. To protect privacy against the eavesdropper, a state decomposition scheme is developed where the original state of
each agent is decomposed into two sub-states: one succeeds the role of the original state in inter-node interactions, while the other
sub-state only communicates with the first one and is invisible to other neighboring agents. Rigorous analyses are performed to
show that 1) the proposed privacy scheme preserves the convergence of the average consensus; and 2) the privacy of the agents
is protected such that an eavesdropper cannot discover the private reference signals with any guaranteed accuracy. The developed
privacy-preserving dynamic average consensus framework is then applied to the formation control of multiple non-holonomic mo-
bile robots, in which the efficacy of the scheme is demonstrated. Numerical simulation is provided to illustrate the effectiveness of
the proposed approach.
Keywords: Dynamic Average Consensus, Privacy Preservation, Non-holonomic Mobile Robots
1. Introduction
Average consensus has been extensively studied in recent
years. It underpins many advantages of distributed systems and
is emerging as an effective tool for diverse applications, includ-
ing sensor fusion [1, 22], distributed resource allocation [15],
and multi-agent coordination [19, 23]. Based on the type of sig-
nals to be averaged, average consensus algorithms can be cate-
gorized as static [21, 24, 25] or dynamic [2–4, 7, 29, 32], where
in static average consensus agents seek to reach agreement on
the average of initial agent states, whereas the dynamic aver-
age consensus is to design a distributed update law such that all
agents can track the average of locally available time-varying
reference signals. As dynamic average consensus has many
emerging applications in distributed control and estimation, it
will be the focus of this paper.
So far, different approaches have been proposed to address
the dynamic average consensus problems. The initial work [29]
designs a consensus algorithm that can track the average of ref-
erence signals with steady states. Based on input-to-state stabil-
ity property, a proportional-integral (PI) algorithm is proposed
in [7] to achieve consensus task for slowly time-varying and
∗Corresponding author Z. Li. Tel. +1-5174321821.
Email addresses: zhangk64@msu.edu (Kaixiang Zhang),
lizhaoj1@egr.msu.edu (Zhaojian Li), yongqiw@clemson.edu
(Yongqiang Wang), a.louati@psau.edu.sa (Ali Louati),
jchen@zju.edu.cn (Jian Chen)
static reference signals. The PI algorithm is further general-
ized in [2] and can converge with zero steady-state error if the
Laplace transform of reference signals has a common monic
denominator polynomial. Moreover, nonsmooth algorithms are
developed in [3, 4] to accomplish finite-time consensus conver-
gence.
In the aforementioned dynamic average consensus methods,
each agent needs to share the explicit state value with its neigh-
boring agents, which can breach the privacy of participating
agents as the state values typically contain privacy-sensitive in-
formation such as its local reference signals. For example, an
eavesdropper can wiretap the communication channel and infer
privacy-sensitive information based on the exchanged signals.
Considering the aforementioned issue and growing awareness
of security, it is an urgent need to protect the agents’ privacy
in dynamic average consensus. So far the privacy preservation
schemes have been mainly focused on static average consen-
sus while results on the privacy of dynamic average consen-
sus are very sparse. For examples, studies in [18, 20, 26] use
carefully designed perturbation signals to obfuscate the states
to protect the transmitted state information. Another idea is
to exploit cryptography to improve the resilience of static av-
erage consensus algorithms to privacy attacks [8, 9, 27]. In
our prior work [30], a state decomposition method is devel-
oped for static average consensus, which can guarantee the pri-
vacy of all participating agents and is light-weight in calcula-
tion. In this work, we extend the state decomposition technique
to dynamic average consensus. Note that as dynamic average
consensus involves time-varying reference signals, the privacy
design in static average consensus cannot be directly applied
[16, 20]. The privacy design and analysis herein rely upon al-
gebraic graph theory and Lyapunov-based control theory, which
are more challenging as compared to those in [30].
In this paper, we first illustrate the necessity of privacy pro-
tection by designing an attack model where an external eaves-
dropper can wiretap the reference signals when the agent states
are updated following a conventional dynamic average consen-
sus algorithm. We will then develop a state decomposition
scheme to decompose the original state of each agent into two
sub-states to achieve privacy preservation in dynamic average
consensus. Specifically, one sub-state takes the role of the orig-
inal state to interact with neighboring agents, while the other
sub-state is invisible to the outside world and only exchanges
information with the first sub-state. To ensure that the consen-
sus algorithm with state decomposition retains the same aver-
age consensus results as the conventional method, the reference
signals of the two sub-states are selected with their mean equal
to the reference signals of the original state. We rigorously
show that the proposed state decomposition scheme can protect
the private reference signals from being inferred by the exter-
nal eavesdropper. In addition, a case study on formation con-
trol of non-holonomicmobile robots is presented, which shows
that the developed approach can be integrated with the tracking
controller to accomplish privacy-preserving distributed control.
Simulation results are given to validate the performance of the
state decomposition scheme.
The remainder of this paper is organized as follows. Section
2 introduces a conventional dynamic average consensus algo-
rithm and the privacy definition. A corresponding eavesdrop-
ping strategy is then presented in Section 3. The state decompo-
sition scheme for privacy preservation is developed in Section 4
and further exploited in Section 5 to accomplish the formation
control of non-holonomicmobile robots. Simulation results are
provided in Section 6. Finally, the conclusion is given in Sec-
tion 7.
2. Preliminaries
2.1. Dynamic Average Consensus
We first review the dynamic average consensus problem.
Consider n agents where each has a time-varying reference sig-
nal ri(t) ∈ Rm, i = 1, 2, · · · , n, satisfying the following dynam-
ics:
r˙i(t) = fi(t). (1)
In (1) fi(t) ∈ Rm is the derivative of the reference signal.
Each agent i has access to ri(t), fi(t) as well as information
from a subset of the other agents. This subset is referred to
as the neighborhood of agent i and denoted by Ni. A graph
G , {V,E} is used to describe the network topology be-
tween the agents, where V , {1, 2, · · · , n} is the node set and
E ,
{
(i, j)|i ∈ N j, j = 1, 2, · · · , n
}
is the edge set. We consider
undirected graph where j ∈ Ni implies i ∈ N j. A graph is con-
nected if and only if there is a path from any node to any other
node. The adjacency matrix A ,
[
ai j
]
∈ Rn×n of G is defined
as follows: ai j = 1 if (i, j) ∈ E; ai j = 0 otherwise. The degree
of agent i is di ,
∑n
j=1 ai j, and the degree matrix is given by
D , diag (d1, · · · , dn) ∈ Rn×n. The Laplacian matrix of G is
then defined as L , D − A ∈ Rn×n.
In addition, each agent i keeps an internal state xi(t) ∈ Rm,
i = 1, 2, · · · , n, and the objective of the dynamic average con-
sensus is to design a distributed algorithm, such that all agents
will finally track the average of the n time-varying reference
signals, i.e., ‖xi(t)− 1n
∑n
j=1 r j(t)‖ → 0 as t → ∞. Assuming that
the graph is undirected and connected, and the signals ri(t) and
fi(t) are bounded, the following algorithm can be exploited to
achieve the dynamic average consensus [29]:
x˙i(t) = fi(t) + κ
n∑
j=1
ai j
(
x j(t) − xi(t)
)
,
xi(0) = ri(0), ∀i ∈ V,
(2)
where κ ∈ R is a positive constant. Using a time-domain anal-
ysis, [16] shows that if each input signal fi(t), i = 1, 2, · · · , n,
is bounded, all the agents implementing algorithm (2) over a
connected graph are input-to-state stable and the tracking er-
rors are ultimately bounded. Moreover, the convergence rate to
the error bound is no worse than κλ2(L), where λ2(L) ∈ R is the
second smallest eigenvalue of the Laplacian matrix L.
2.2. Privacy Definition
As can be seen from (2), the conventional dynamic aver-
age consensus algorithm involves the exchange of states among
neighboring agents, which can leak privacy-sensitive informa-
tion such as the local reference signals. In this paper, we con-
sider an eavesdropping attacker who knows the network topol-
ogy and can wiretap communication channels and access ex-
changed information. Specifically, we consider the case where
the eavesdropper is interested in obtaining the reference signals
ri(t) and fi(t).
Based on the above discussion, the definition of privacy in
dynamic average consensus is given by:
Definition 1. For a connected graph with n agents, the privacy
of the reference signals ri(t) and fi(t) from agent i is preserved
if an external eavesdropper cannot estimate the values of ri(t)
and fi(t) with any accuracy.
This privacy definition requires that an eavesdropping ad-
versary cannot even approximately estimate (e.g., find a finite
range for) the private signals and thus is more stringent than the
privacy definition in [10, 17] which defines privacy preserva-
tion as the inability of an adversary to uniquely determine the
protected value. Furthermore, the privacy-preserving dynamic
average consensus has potential applications in emerging dis-
tributed automated systems. For example, multiple power gen-
erators in the smart grid can exploit the consensus scheme to
reach agreement on the average planned power generation of
the whole network and keep their individual evolving genera-
tion plan secret since the generation plan is sensitive in bidding
the right for energy selling [6]. Another example is the forma-
tion control of multiple mobile robots, which will be detailed in
Section 5.
3. Privacy Attack Model
We now show that the dynamic consensus algorithm (2) is
not privacy preserving, that is, the external eavesdropper can
successfully obtain the reference signals ri(t) and fi(t) when
agents follow the consensus algorithm in (2).
In particular, let xˆi(t) ∈ Rm, rˆi(t) ∈ Rm, and fˆi(t) ∈ Rm be the
eavesdropper’s estimates of xi(t), ri(t), and fi(t), respectively.
An observer based attack model can be designed to estimate
ri(t) and fi(t) as follows:
˙ˆxi(t) = fˆi(t) + κ
n∑
j=1
ai j
(
x j(t) − xi(t)
)
+ k1 x˜i(t),
˙ˆri(t) = k2 (xi(t) − zi(t) − rˆi(t)) + fˆi(t),
fˆi(t) = k3xi(t) + fˆ
′
i (t),
˙ˆf ′i (t) = −k3
 fˆi(t) + κ
n∑
j=1
ai j
(
x j(t) − xi(t)
) + k4 x˜i(t),
(3)
where k1, k2, k3, k4 ∈ R are positive constants to be designed,
x˜i(t) , xi(t) − xˆi(t) ∈ Rm is the estimation error, fˆ ′i (t) ∈ Rm is
an auxiliary variable, and zi(t) ∈ Rm is the local filter updated
by
z˙i(t) = κ
n∑
j=1
ai j
(
x j(t) − xi(t)
)
,
zi(0) = 0.
(4)
Theorem 1. When the algorithm in (2) is utilized to achieve
dynamic average consensus, the external eavesdropper can in-
fer the reference signals ri(t) and fi(t) by using the observer in
(3). More precisely, assuming that the signals ri(t), fi(t), and
f˙i(t) are bounded, i.e., ri(t), fi(t), f˙i(t) ∈ L∞, then
1. The attacker using (3) is guaranteed to obtain the private
reference information in the sense that the estimation er-
rors r˜i(t) , ri(t) − rˆi(t), f˜i(t) , fi(t) − fˆi(t) ∈ Rm are
uniformly ultimately bounded (UUB).
2. If f˙i(t) is in the L2-space, the estimation errors r˜i(t) and
f˜i(t) converge to zero asymptotically.
Proof. To prove the first claim, a non-negative Lyapunov func-
tion V(t) ∈ R is introduced, as follows:
V(t) ,
1
2
k4 x˜
T
i (t)x˜i(t) +
1
2
r˜Ti (t)r˜i(t) +
1
2
f˜ Ti (t) f˜i(t), (5)
from which it follows that V(t) can be bounded by
µyT (t)y(t) ≤ V(t) ≤ µyT (t)y(t), (6)
where µ , min
{
1
2
k4,
1
2
}
, µ , max
{
1
2
k4,
1
2
}
∈ R, and y(t) ,[
x˜T
i
(t) r˜T
i
(t) f˜ T
i
(t)
]T ∈ R3m is the augmented estimate vector.
Taking the time derivative of (5) and substituting it in (2)-(4)
yield
V˙(t) = k4 x˜
T
i (t) ˙˜xi(t) + r˜
T
i (t)˙˜ri(t) + f˜
T
i (t)
˙˜fi(t)
= −k1k4 x˜Ti (t)x˜i(t) − k2r˜Ti (t)r˜i(t) − k3 f˜ Ti (t) f˜i(t)
+ r˜Ti (t) f˜i(t) + f˜
T
i (t) f˙i(t)
≤ −k1k4 x˜Ti (t)x˜i(t) −
k2
2
r˜Ti (t)r˜i(t)
−
(
k3
2
− 1
2k2
)
f˜ Ti (t) f˜i(t) +
1
2k3
f˙ Ti (t) f˙i(t)
≤ −µyT (t)y(t) + ̺(t),
(7)
where µ , min
{
k1k4,
k2
2
,
k3
2
− 1
2k2
}
∈ R and ̺(t) ,
1
2k3
f˙ T
i
(t) f˙i(t) ∈ R. It is clear that µ is positive provided that
k2 and k3 are chosen to satisfy k3 >
1
k2
. Since f˙i(t) ∈ L∞, ̺(t) is
bounded. By utilizing (6) and (7), Theorem 4.18 in [14] can be
invoked to show that y(t), i.e., x˜i(t), r˜i(t) and f˜i(t), is UUB.
We now prove the second claim. Based on the assumption
f˙i(t) ∈ L2, it can be obtained that there exists a bounded positive
constant ι ∈ R such that ∀t ≥ 0,
∫ t
0
1
2k3
f˙ Ti (τ) f˙i(τ)dτ ≤ ι.
Let the non-negative functionW(t) ∈ R be defined as
W(t) , V(t) + ι −
∫ t
0
1
2k3
f˙ Ti (τ) f˙i(τ)dτ. (8)
Taking the time derivative of (8) and utilizing (7), it can be
concluded that
W˙(t) = −k1k4 x˜Ti (t)x˜i(t) −
k2
2
r˜Ti (t)r˜i(t)
−
(
k3
2
− 1
2k2
)
f˜ Ti (t) f˜i(t) ≤ 0.
(9)
According to (8) and (9), it follows that W(t) ∈ L∞, i.e., x˜i(t),
r˜i(t) f˜i(t) ∈ L∞
⋂L2. The boundedness of ri(t), fi(t), f˙i(t) and
the expression in (3) can be used to conclude that ˙˜xi(t), ˙˜ri(t),
˙˜fi(t) ∈ L∞. As x˜i(t), r˜i(t), f˜i(t) ∈ L∞
⋂L2 and ˙˜xi(t), ˙˜ri(t),
˙˜fi(t) ∈ L∞, Barbalat’s lemma [14] can be used to conclude that
x˜i(t), r˜i(t) and f˜i(t) converge to zero asymptotically.
Remark 1. The design of the observer in (3) is to illustrate
that the consensus algorithm in (2) is vulnerable to privacy at-
tacks. Various techniques can be exploited to construct the at-
tack model, and it is not the focus of this paper. In the following,
we will present a privacy scheme and show that the approach
can provide privacy protection against the external eavesdrop-
per no matter what attack model is used.
4. Privacy Preservation via State Decomposition
Building upon our prior work [30], in this section, we extend
the state decomposition scheme to dynamic average consensus.
Note that here we aim at protecting privacy against any eaves-
dropping scheme (including the example shown in Section 3).
(a) (b)
Figure 1: State decomposition: (a) Before state decomposition. (b) After state
decomposition.
More specifically, the state decomposition scheme decomposes
the state and reference signals {xi(t), ri(t), fi(t)} of each agent
into two sub-sets
{
xα
i
(t), rα
i
(t), f α
i
(t)
}
and
{
x
β
i
(t), r
β
i
(t), f
β
i
(t)
}
. The
initial values rα
i
(0) and r
β
i
(0) can be randomly chosen from the
set of all real numbers under the following constraint:
rαi (0) + r
β
i
(0) = 2ri(0). (10)
Furthermore, f α
i
(t) and f
β
i
(t) are bounded and chosen to satisfy:
f αi (t) + f
β
i
(t) = 2 fi(t). (11)
In this decomposition mechanism, the sub-state xα
i
(t) takes the
role of the original state xi(t) in inter-agent interactions and is
the only state value from agent i that will be shared with its
neighbors. The other sub-state x
β
i
(t) also involves in the dis-
tributed updates by (and only by) exchanging information with
xα
i
(t). Therefore, x
β
i
(t) will affect the evolution of xα
i
(t), but the
existence of x
β
i
(t) is invisible to neighbors of agent i and the
eavesdropper. An example is given in Figure 1 to illustrate the
state decomposition of a network with four agents.
Under the decomposition mechanism, the conventional aver-
age consensus algorithm in (2) becomes
x˙αi (t) = f
α
i (t) + κ
n∑
j=1
ai j
(
xαj (t) − xαi (t)
)
+ κ
(
x
β
i
(t) − xαi (t)
)
,
x˙
β
i
(t) = f
β
i
(t) + κ
(
xαi (t) − xβi (t)
)
,
xαi (0) = r
α
i (0), x
β
i
(0) = r
β
i
(0), ∀i ∈ V.
(12)
In the following, we first show that all states xα
i
(t) and x
β
i
(t) will
present similar convergence properties as in the conventional
case (2). Then, we prove that under the decomposition mecha-
nism, the privacy of each agent is protected against an external
eavesdropper.
Theorem 2. Under the decomposition mechanism, all sub-
states xα
i
(t) and x
β
i
(t) in (12) are input-to-state stable, and the
tracking errors xα
i
(t)− 1
n
∑n
j=1 r j(t) and x
β
i
(t)− 1
n
∑n
j=1 r j(t) are ul-
timately bounded. Moreover, the convergence rate of the track-
ing errors is no worse than κ
2
(
λ2(L) + 2 −
√
λ2
2
(L) + 4
)
, where
L is the Laplacian matrix of graph before state decomposition
and λ2(L) ∈ R is the second smallest eigenvalue of L.
Proof. It is clear that the decomposition mechanism ensures
that all sub-states also compose a connected graph. Based
on the results in [16], dynamic average consensus can still be
achieved, i.e., all sub-states are input-to-state stable, and the
convergence errors xα
i
(t) − 1
2n
∑n
j=1
(
rα
j
(t) + r
β
j
(t)
)
and x
β
i
(t) −
1
2n
∑n
j=1
(
rα
j
(t) + r
β
j
(t)
)
are ultimately bounded. It can be ob-
tained from (10) and (11) that
rαi (t) + r
β
i
(t) = 2ri(t), (13)
which implies 1
2n
∑n
j=1
(
rα
j
(t) + r
β
j
(t)
)
= 1
n
∑n
j=1 r j(t). Therefore,
all sub-states xα
i
(t) and x
β
i
(t) in (12) retain the convergence to
the neighborhood of the same average consensus value as the
original states.
Let Lαβ ∈ R2n×2n be the Laplacian matrix of the graph com-
posed by all sub-states. By leveraging the results in [16],
it can be concluded that the convergence rate of the consen-
sus algorithm is no worse than κλ2(L
αβ), where λ2(L
αβ) ∈
R is the second smallest eigenvalue of Lαβ. To complete
the proof of Theorem 2, we next show that λ2(L
αβ) =
1
2
(
λ2(L) + 2 −
√
λ2
2
(L) + 4
)
. According to the decomposition
mechanism, Lαβ can be formulated as
Lαβ =
[
L + In −In
−In In
]
, (14)
with In ∈ Rn×n being the n-dimensional identity matrix. Let
λ(Lαβ), λ(L) ∈ R be the eigenvalue of Lαβ and L, respectively.
Based on (14) and the eigenvalue-eigenvector equation [11], it
can be derived that
λ(Lαβ) =
1
2
(
λ(L) + 2 ±
√
λ2(L) + 4
)
. (15)
From (15), it can be further deduced that the second smallest
eigenvalue of Lαβ, i.e., λ2(L
αβ), is 1
2
(
λ2(L) + 2 −
√
λ2
2
(L) + 4
)
,
which completes the proof.
Remark 2. Given a graph topology, the second smallest eigen-
value of Laplacian λ2(·) is a measure of the convergence rate of
consensus algorithms [21]. The convergence rate of the algo-
rithm in (2) is no worse than κλ2(L), and after state decomposi-
tion, this measure will decrease to κ
2
(
λ2(L) + 2 −
√
λ2
2
(L) + 4
)
since the connectivity of the graph becomes weaker.
We next show that the decomposition scheme can protect the
privacy of the agents against the external eavesdropper.
Theorem 3. Under the decomposition mechanism, an external
eavesdropper cannot infer the reference signals rp(t) and fp(t)
of any agent p with any guaranteed accuracy.
Proof. Under the decomposition mechanism, the information
accessible to the eavesdropper at time t can be defined as
I(t) ,
{
A, κ, xα
i
(t), i = 1, 2, · · · , n
}
. To show that the privacy of
the reference signals rp(t) and fp(t) can be preserved against
the eavesdropper, it suffices to present that under any value
r¯p(t) = r¯p(0) +
∫ t
0
f¯p(τ)dτ satisfying r¯p(t) , rp(t), the informa-
tion I¯(t) ,
{
A, κ, x¯α
i
(t), i = 1, 2, · · · , n
}
accessible to the eaves-
dropper could be exactly the same as the information I(t) cu-
mulated under rp(t). This is because the only information avail-
able for the eavesdropper to extract the signals rp(t) and fp(t)
is I(t), and if I(t) could be the outcome under any value of
rp(t), then the eavesdropper has no way to even find a range
for rp(t) and fp(t). Therefore, we only need to prove that for
any r¯p(t) , rp(t), I¯(t) = I(t) could hold.
Let agent l be one of the neighbors of agent p. Next we show
that given r¯p(t) (i.e., r¯p(0) and f¯p(t)), by suitably selecting the
values of r¯l(0), r¯
α
p(0), r¯
β
p(0), r¯
α
l
(0), r¯
β
l
(0), f¯ αp (t), f¯
β
p (t), f¯
α
l
(t), and
f¯
β
l
(t), I¯(t) = I(t) could hold under r¯p(t) , rp(t). Specifically,
under the following conditions:
r¯l(0) = rl(0) + rp(0) − r¯p(0),
r¯αp(0) = r
α
p(0), r¯
β
p(0) = 2r¯p(0) − rαp(0),
r¯αl (0) = r
α
l (0), r¯
β
l
(0) = 2r¯l(0) − rαl (0),
r¯q(0) = rq(0), r¯
α
q (0) = r
α
q (0), r¯
β
q(0) = r
β
q(0),∀q ∈ V \ {p, l} ,
(16)
f¯l(t) = fl(t) + fp(t) − f¯p(t),
f¯ αp (t) = f
α
p (t) + 2κ
(
rp(t) − r¯p(t)
)
, f¯
β
p (t) = 2 f¯p(t) − f¯ αp (t),
f¯ αl (t) = f
α
l (t) + 2κ
(
r¯p(t) − rp(t)
)
, f¯
β
l
(t) = 2 f¯l(t) − f¯ αl (t),
f¯q(t) = fq(t), f¯
α
q (t) = f
α
q (t), f¯
β
q (t) = f
β
q (t),∀q ∈ V \ {p, l} ,
(17)
and system dynamics
˙¯xαi (t) = f¯
α
i (t) + κ
n∑
j=1
ai j
(
x¯αj (t) − x¯αi (t)
)
+ κ
(
x¯
β
i
(t) − x¯αi (t)
)
,
˙¯x
β
i
(t) = f¯
β
i
(t) + κ
(
x¯αi (t) − x¯βi (t)
)
,
x¯αi (0) = r¯
α
i (0), x¯
β
i
(0) = r¯
β
i
(0), ∀i ∈ V,
(18)
the new sub-state x¯α
i
(t) will be the same as xα
i
(t), for all i ∈ V,
i.e., I¯(t) = I(t). Note that the first equations in both (16) and
(17) are introduced to ensure that the average consensus value
1
n
∑n
j=1 r¯ j(t) is the same as the original one
1
n
∑n
j=1 r j(t). Now
we prove that I¯(t) = I(t). First, from (10), (12), (16), and (18),
it can be obtained that
x¯αp(0) = x
α
p(0), x¯
β
p(0) = x
β
p(0) + 2
(
r¯p(0) − rp(0)
)
,
x¯αl (0) = x
α
l (0), x¯
β
l
(0) = x
β
l
(0) + 2
(
rp(0) − r¯p(0)
)
,
x¯αq (0) = x
α
q (0), x¯
β
q(0) = x
β
q(0),∀q ∈ V \ {p, l} .
(19)
Furthermore, based on (17) and (19), it can be verified that
x¯αp(t) = x
α
p(t), x¯
β
p(t) = x
β
p(t) + 2
(
r¯p(t) − rp(t)
)
,
x¯αl (t) = x
α
l (t), x¯
β
l
(t) = x
β
l
(t) + 2
(
rp(t) − r¯p(t)
)
,
x¯αq (t) = x
α
q (t), x¯
β
q(t) = x
β
q(t),∀q ∈ V \ {p, l} ,
(20)
is the solution to (18). It is obvious that the solution (20) sat-
isfies ∀i ∈ V, x¯α
i
(t) = xα
i
(t), and thus I¯(t) = I(t) could hold
under r¯p(t) , rp(t). Based on the above analysis, it can be con-
cluded that no matter what attack model is used, the eavesdrop-
per cannot infer rp(t) and fp(t) from I(t) with any guaranteed
accuracy.
Remark 3. The proposed state decomposition scheme is a gen-
eral privacy-preserving augmentation to dynamic average con-
sensus algorithms. While the above analysis is based on the
dynamic consensus algorithm in (2), the state decomposition
framework can be integrated with other dynamic average con-
sensus approaches (e.g., [2–4, 7]) to improve the resilience of
original methods to privacy attacks.
Remark 4. The proposed state decomposition scheme is a sig-
nificant extension on the basis of the work [30]. Different
from [30] that focuses on protecting the privacy in discrete-time
static average consensus, we exploit the decomposition mech-
anism to achieve the privacy preservation in continuous-time
dynamic average consensus. As dynamic average consensus
involves dynamically evolving reference signals, more sophis-
ticated analytical tools relying on algebraic graph theory and
control theory are used to conduct the development of the pro-
posed scheme.
5. Application to Formation Control
In this section, the privacy-preserving dynamic average con-
sensus is applied to the formation control of non-holonomic
mobile robots under the adversarial environment with eaves-
dropping attackers.
5.1. Formation Control Objective
Figure 2: Dynamic consensus based formation control. The triangles are the
non-holonomic mobile robots; the circles are the mobile targets; and the cross
is the center of the mobile targets.
In particular, consider n networked non-holonomic mobile
robots and n mobile moving targets in the motion plane.
Each mobile robot i has access to its own position si(t) ,[
sxi(t) syi(t)
]T ∈ R2 and can monitor the mobile target i’s
position pi(t) ,
[
pxi(t) pyi(t)
]T ∈ R2 and velocity p˙i(t) =
qi(t) ,
[
qxi(t) qyi(t)
]T ∈ R2. si(t), pi(t), and qi(t) are all
expressed with respect to the inertial coordinate frame. Each
mobile robot shares relevant information with its neighbors via
wireless communication. We consider the case that the mobile
robots and targets are operating in the adversarial environment
with eavesdropping attackers. The objective of the networked
mobile robots is to follow the set of mobile targets by spreading
out in a pre-specified formation while preserving the privacy of
mobile targets against the eavesdropper. Specifically, the for-
mation control requires that by using the information received
from the communication network, each mobile robot i is driven
to a relative vector bi(t) ,
[
bxi(t) byi(t)
]T ∈ R2 with respect
to the time-varying geometric center of the mobile targets, i.e.,
si(t) → 1n
∑n
i=1 pi(t) + bi(t) as t → ∞. Meanwhile, since each
mobile robot can only monitor one mobile target, it needs to
cooperate with its neighbors to compute the geometric center,
which induces the risk of breaching the privacy of mobile tar-
gets. An external eavesdropper can use the leaked sensitive in-
formation, such as the position and/or velocity information, to
maliciously track and attack the mobile targets. Therefore, it is
important that the formation control scheme can protect the pri-
vacy of mobile targets against the eavesdropping attacker, i.e.,
an external eavesdropper cannot identify the position and/or ve-
locity of mobile targets based on the network information. An
example scenario in which a team of mobile robots tracks a
group of mobile targets is depicted in Figure 2.
5.2. Control Design
As discussed in [16, 23], the formation control problem in
the aforementioned scenario can be addressed with a two-layer
method. In the cyber layer, the privacy-preserving dynamic av-
erage consensus algorithm is used to estimate the geometric
center of mobile targets in a distributed manner, while in the
physical layer, the mobile robot i is actuated to follow the esti-
mate of the geometric center with a desired relative bias bi(t).
The implementation details are given now.
In the cyber layer, the state decomposition based dynamic
average consensus algorithm presented in Section 4 is utilized
for the calculation of the geometric center 1
n
∑n
i=1 pi(t) and the
privacy preservation of mobile targets. More precisely, let
cα
i
(t) ,
[
cα
xi
(t) cα
yi
(t)
]T ∈ R2 and cβ
i
(t) ,
[
c
β
xi
(t) c
β
yi
(t)
]T ∈ R2
be two sub-sets of the geometric center estimates, which are
updated by
c˙αi (t) = q
α
i (t) + κ
n∑
j=1
ai j
(
cαj (t) − cαi (t)
)
+ κ
(
c
β
i
(t) − cαi (t)
)
,
c˙
β
i
(t) = q
β
i
(t) + κ
(
cαi (t) − cβi (t)
)
,
cαi (0) = p
α
i (0), c
β
i
(0) = p
β
i
(0),
(21)
where pα
i
(0), p
β
i
(0), qα
i
(t), q
β
i
(t) ∈ R2 are selected to satisfy
pαi (0) + p
β
i
(0) = 2pi(0),
qαi (t) + q
β
i
(t) = 2qi(t).
(22)
As shown in Theorem 2 and Theorem 3, cα
i
(t) will converge to
the neighbourhood of the geometric center 1
n
∑n
i=1 pi(t), and the
mobile targets’ information cannot be identified by the external
eavesdropper.
In the physical layer, the objective now is to design a track-
ing controller for non-holonomic mobile robot i to ensure that
si(t) → cαi (t) + bi(t) as t → ∞. The kinematic model of non-
holonomic mobile robot i is described by
s˙xi(t) = vi(t) cos(θi(t)),
s˙yi(t) = vi(t) sin(θi(t)),
θ˙i(t) = ωi(t),
(23)
where θi(t) ∈ R is the heading angle expressed in the inertial
coordinate frame, and vi(t), ωi(t) ∈ R are the linear and angular
velocity, respectively. To facilitate the following development,
the desired heading angle θdi(t) ∈ R and desired linear velocity
vdi(t) ∈ R are constructed as
θdi(t) = arctan
(
c˙α
yi
(t)
c˙α
xi
(t)
)
,
vdi(t) =
√
(c˙α
xi
(t))2 + (c˙α
yi
(t))2,
(24)
which indicates that c˙xi(t) and c˙yi(t) can be rewritten as c˙xi(t) =
vdi(t) cos(θdi(t)), c˙yi(t) = vdi(t) sin(θdi(t)). Based on coordinate
transformation, the system errors are defined as
exi(t) , cos(θi(t))(sxi(t) − cαxi(t) − bxi(t))
+ sin(θi(t))(syi(t) − cαyi(t) − byi(t)),
eyi(t) , − sin(θi(t))(sxi(t) − cαxi(t) − bxi(t))
+ cos(θi(t))(syi(t) − cαyi(t) − byi(t)),
eθi(t) , θi(t) − θdi(t).
(25)
It is clear that si(t) → cαi (t)+bi(t) as
[
exi(t) eyi(t) eθi(t)
]
→ 0.
Note that the mobile robot is subjected to non-holonomic con-
straint, and thus in general time-varying auxiliary variables are
needed to facilitate the controller design [12, 13, 31]. Consider-
ing the non-holonomic constraint, an auxiliary error e¯θi(t) ∈ R
is defined as
e¯θi(t) , eθi(t) − ρi(t), (26)
where the time-varying signal ρi(t) ∈ R is given by
ρi(t) , ι0̟i(t) tanh
(
ι1
√
e2
xi
(t) + e2
yi
(t)
)
sin(ι2t) (27)
with ̟i(t) , exp
(
−
∫ t
0
|vdi(τ)|dτ
)
∈ R and ι0, ι1, ι2 ∈ R being
positive constants. To achieve the formation control, the veloc-
ity inputs vi(t) and ωi(t) are designed as
vi(t) = −γ1 tanh(exi(t)) + cos(eθi(t))vdi(t),
ωi(t) = −γ2 tanh(e¯θi(t)) + ρ˙i(t) − γ3sgn(e¯θi(t))
− γ4
sin(eθi(t)) − sin(ρi(t))
e¯θi(t)
vdi(t)eyi(t),
(28)
where γ1, γ2, γ3, γ4 ∈ R are positive control gains, and sgn(·) is
the standard signum function.
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Figure 3: Simulation results of conventional dynamic average consensus (2): (a) System state convergence. (b) Estimation of p1(t) with the eavesdropping scheme
developed in Section 3. (c) Estimation of q1(t) with the eavesdropping scheme developed in Section 3.
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Figure 4: Simulation results of privacy-preserving dynamic average consensus (21): (a) System state convergence. (b) Estimation of p1(t) with the eavesdropping
scheme developed in Section 3. (c) Estimation of q1(t) with the eavesdropping scheme developed in Section 3.
Theorem 4. The controller designed in (28) ensures that the
system errors exi(t), eyi(t), and eθi(t) (i = 1, 2, · · · , n) asymptot-
ically converge to zero in the sense that
lim
t→∞
exi(t), eyi(t), eθi(t) = 0. (29)
Proof. See Appendix A.
According to the definition of exi(t), eyi(t), and eθi(t), it can
be concluded that si(t) → cαi (t) + bi(t) as (29) holds. Since
cα
i
(t) will converge to the neighbourhood of the geometric cen-
ter 1
n
∑n
i=1 pi(t), the formation control task is accomplished as
(29) holds.
6. Simulation Results
In this section, simulation is conducted to demonstrate the
performance of the developed approach. A team of four mobile
robots are employed to follow a group of four mobile targets
and maintain a rectangle formation. The network structure of
the mobile robots is the same as the one shown in Figure 2. The
initial positions and velocities of mobile targets are as follows:
p1(0) =
[
1.8
1.2
]
, p2(0) =
[−1.2
1.8
]
,
p3(0) =
[−1.8
−1.2
]
, p4(0) =
[
1.2
−1.8
]
,
q1(t) = q0(t) +
[
0.1 cos(0.2t)
−0.2 cos(0.4t)
]
,
q2(t) = q0(t) +
[−0.2 cos(0.4t)
0.1 cos(0.2t)
]
,
q3(t) = q0(t) +
[−0.1 cos(0.2t)
0.2 cos(0.4t)
]
,
q4(t) = q0(t) +
[
0.2 cos(0.4t)
−0.1 cos(0.2t)
]
,
where q0(t) ∈ R2 is given by
q0(t) = (0.75 − 0.25 cos(0.24t))
[
cos( π
9
+ 0.5 sin(0.2t))
sin( π
9
+ 0.5 sin(0.2t))
]
.
Furthermore, the initial positions of the mobile robots are se-
lected as s1(0) =
[
1.3 5.2
]T
, s2(0) =
[
−7.5 2.6
]T
, s3(0) =
[
−4 −5.5
]T
, and s4(0) =
[
5.2 −5.2
]T
. For the mobile robots,
the desired relative positions to the geometric center of mo-
bile targets are given by b1(0) =
[
4 4
]T
, b2(0) =
[
−4 4
]T
,
b3(0) =
[
−4 −4
]T
, and b4(0) =
[
4 −4
]T
. In the following,
we first evaluate the state decomposition based dynamic aver-
age consensus algorithm and then test the formation controller
designed in (28).
Suppose that an external eavesdropper is interested in obtain-
ing the information of mobile target 1 and uses the eavesdrop-
ping scheme developed in Section 3 to infer p1(t) and q1(t). To
better demonstrate the performance of the proposed consensus
scheme, both the conventional algorithm in (2) and the devel-
oped privacy-preserving algorithm are used to estimate the geo-
metric center of mobile targets. Figure 3 shows the evolution of
the network states as well as the eavesdropping states under the
conventional algorithm (2). It can be seen that the eavesdrop-
per can successfully infer p1(t) and q1(t) when the agents are
updated with algorithm (2). The performance of the privacy-
preserving scheme (21) is illustrated in Figure 4. It is clear that
the proposed scheme can achieve dynamic average consensus
while protect the privacy of the mobile target.
As discussed in Section 5, the dynamic average consensus al-
gorithm is used to estimate the geometric center of mobile tar-
gets, and then the mobile robots are driven with the controller
(28) to achieve the formation task. Figure 2 depicts the motion
trajectories of all mobile robots, showing that all robots follow
the geometric center by spreading out in a desired rectangle
pattern. Moreover, the evolution of the formation tracking er-
rors are presented in Figure 6. From Figure 6, it can be seen
that the tracking errors exi(t), eyi(t), and eθi(t) all asymptotically
converge to small values that are close to zero.
-10 -5 0 5 10 15 20 25 30
-10
-5
0
5
10
15
20
Figure 5: Motion trajectories of all mobile robots.
7. Conclusion
This paper developed a state decomposition based privacy-
preserving method for continuous-time dynamic average con-
sensus. We showed that existing dynamic consensus algorithm
is susceptible to eavesdropping attacks with a carefully de-
signed filter. We then rigorously proved that the state decompo-
sition scheme can enable privacy preservation without affect-
ing the consensus results. Furthermore, the proposed method
Figure 6: Formation control errors of each mobile robot.
was successfully applied to achieve formation control for non-
holonomicmobile robots. Simulation results showed that by us-
ing the proposed method, the group of networked mobile robot
can spread out in a pre-specified formation without disclosing
private information.
Appendix A. Proof of Theorem 4
Proof. To prove Theorem 4, the Lyapunov function Vi(t) ∈
R, i = 1, 2, · · · , n is defined as
Vi(t) ,
1
2
γ4
(
e2xi + e
2
yi
)
+
1
2
e¯2θi. (A.1)
Based on (23), (25)-(28) and the facts that c˙xi(t) =
vdi(t) cos(θdi(t)), c˙yi(t) = vdi(t) sin(θdi(t)), the closed-loop error
dynamics can be derived, as follows:
e˙xi(t) = −γ1 tanh(exi(t)) + ωi(t)eyi(t),
e˙yi(t) = −ωi(t)exi(t) + sin(eθi(t))vdi(t),
˙¯eθi(t) = −γ2 tanh(e¯θi(t)) − θ˙di(t) − γ3sgn(e¯θi(t))
− γ4
sin(eθi(t)) − sin(ρi(t))
e¯θi(t)
vdi(t)eyi(t).
(A.2)
After taking the time derivative of (A.1) and substituting (A.2)
into the derivative, it can be determined that
V˙i(t) = −γ1γ4exi(t) tanh(exi(t)) − γ2e¯θi(t) tanh(e¯θi(t))
+ γ4vdi(t)eyi(t) sin(ρi(t))
− e¯θi(t)
(
γ3sgn(e¯θi(t)) + θ˙di(t)
)
.
(A.3)
If γ3 is selected sufficiently large to satisfy γ3 >
supt∈[0,∞) |θ˙di(t)|, then V˙i(t) is upper bounded by
V˙i(t) ≤ −Wi(t) + γ4|eyi(t)||vdi(t) sin(ρi(t))|
≤
√
2γ4Vi(t)|vdi(t) sin(ρi(t))|,
(A.4)
whereWi(t) ∈ R is a non-negative function given by
Wi , γ1γ4exi(t) tanh(exi(t)) + γ2e¯θi(t) tanh(e¯θi(t)). (A.5)
From (27), it can be found that 0 ≤ ̟i(t) ≤ 1, ˙̟ i(t) =
−|vdi(t)|̟i(t), and |ρi(t)| ≤ ι0̟i(t). Using these facts and in-
tegrating |vdi(t) sin(ρi(t))|, it can be concluded that∫ t
0
|vdi(τ) sin(ρi(τ))|dτ ≤
∫ t
0
|vdi(τ)||ρi(τ)|dτ
≤ι0
∫ t
0
|vdi(τ)|̟i(τ)dτ
≤ι0
∫ t
0
− ˙̟ i(τ)dτ
≤ι0 (̟(0) −̟(t)) ≤ ι0.
(A.6)
Eqn. (A.4) indicates that
d
√
Vi(t)
dt
≤
√
γ4
2
|vdi(t) sin(ρi(t))|, and
then based on (A.6), it can be deduced that
√
Vi(t) ∈ L∞, i.e.,
Vi(t) ∈ L∞. Furthermore, it can be inferred from (28), (A.1),
and (A.2) that exi(t), eyi(t), e¯θi(t), vi(t), ωi(t), e˙xi(t), e˙yi(t), ˙¯eθi(t) ∈
L∞. Taking the time derivative of Wi(t) and using the above
boundedness analysis, it can be derived that W˙i(t) ∈ L∞, which
is a sufficient condition for Wi(t) being uniformly continuous.
Using (A.4), (A.6), and Vi(t) ∈ L∞, it can be concluded that∫ t
0
Wi(τ)dτ ∈ L∞. Based on
∫ t
0
Wi(τ)dτ ∈ L∞ and the uniform
continuity of Wi(t), Barbalat’s lemma [14] can be exploited
to obtain that limt→∞Wi(t) = 0, i.e., limt→∞ exi(t), e¯θi(t) = 0.
With the aid of the extended Barbalat’s lemma [5, 28], it can
be further deduced that limt→∞ eyi(t) = 0. According to (26)
and (27), it is clear that limt→∞ exi(t), eyi(t), e¯θi(t) = 0 implies
limt→∞ exi(t), eyi(t), eθi(t) = 0, which completes the proof of
Theorem 4.
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